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A Nuanced Lakatos Philosophy of Theology and Science

Doug Kennard, Ph. D., Biblical Studies Department, Bryan College, Dayton, TN 37321
Abstract

A Lakatos philosophy of science fosters nuanced precision within critical realism, recognizing that
falsiﬁcation of any theory (for example, evolution) does not occur without providing a better theory.
Imre Lakatos articulated a moderate foundational rational model of derivation in the philosophy
of mathematics and science that utilized Peircian pragmatism to encourage its productivity and to
make sense of paradigm change. Lakatos proposes a sophisticated falsiﬁcation view that encourages
helpful development, because, “There is no falsiﬁcation before the emergence of a better theory.”
Thus a creationist model needs to focus on crafting better theories or creationist models will never be
seriously considered by the academy as a live option. Lakatos’ approach encourages a progressive
orientation current with the latest warranted ﬁndings rather than clinging to a tradition. Justiﬁcation
for the theologian comes from exegesis and grounded philosophizing that contribute to a more
nuanced understanding of an issue. The justiﬁcation for the scientist comes from tested peer reviewed
proposals that contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the issue.
Critical realism is better understood as Lakatos proposed than in Kuhn’s paradigm shift. In
creationism, the Kuhnian radical shift in paradigms would: (a) encourage the creationist to give up
because he lost the battle as the scientiﬁc world shifted from creationism to evolutionism or (b) seek
naive falsiﬁcation of the evolutionary theory. Whereas, a Lakatos theorist would recognize that a more
nuanced model between the extremes might better reﬂect the data in creationism. So a better model
than a Kuhnian paradigm shift would be a Lakatos’ approach illustrated by the contemporary rivalry
among relativistic and quantum theories. A critical realist approach values recognizing the precise
differences of these varied approaches, and crafting a nuanced method that reﬂects this sensitivity.
Examination will include the following methodological approaches to theology and science:
Alister McGrath’s Bhaskerian approach, Nancey Murphy’s post-modern Lakatos’ approach, and my
moderate foundational Lakatos’ approach.
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Introduction
In reaction to the enlightenment epistemologies
in 1916, Roy Sellars proposed the view of “critical
realism.” The view appreciates the empiricism
of Locke and Newton and blends it with the
mathematical rationalism of Descartes and Kepler
and pragmatism of Peirce and James (Sellars, 1916,
pp. 27, 66, 206). This locates a critical realist’s view of
reality within an epistemic dualism, that is, an idea
is not the reality for which it approximates (Drake
et al, 1920, pp. 18–19, 158, 190; Sellars, 1916, pp. 11,
17, 109, 262). Standing against idealism’s (like Plato,
Berkley, Kant, and Process) and view’s dominated
by passion (like romanticism, existentialism and
other populist approaches), critical realism sees this
real world and metaphysical beings as accessible to
the human mind. Sellars claimed, “Truth is, then,
a reﬂective qualiﬁcation of those ideas, beliefs, and
judgments which we regard as giving us knowledge
about some sphere of reality” (Sellars, 1916, p. 277).

He acknowledges that in this view, perception is
subjective (Drake et al., 1920, pp. 3, 206; Sellars,
1916, p. 14). However, as scientiﬁc realism this
approach attempts to render the perception more
precise (Sellars, 1916, pp. 26, 33, 62). To accomplish
this increased precision, pragmatism is utilized to
check the perception (Drake et al., 1920, pp. 35–81,
157–60; Sellars, 1916, pp. 132–134, 164). “Truth is
thus accepted and tested knowledge” (Sellars, 1916,
p. 282). Moreland and Craig summarize the core
tenets of such a scientiﬁc realism (Moreland & Craig,
2003, p. 328):
SR1: Scientiﬁc theories (in mature, developed
sciences) are true or approximately true.
SR2: The central observational and theoretical
terms of a mature scientiﬁc theory genuinely refer
to entities in the world. These terms make existence
claims.
SR3: Given two rival theories, it is in principle
possible to have good reasons for thinking which
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is more likely to be true or approximately true . . .
conceptual relativism (what is rational for one person
or group should not necessarily be so for another
person or group since rationality itself is relative to a
person, scientiﬁc community or theory) is false.
SR4: A scientiﬁc theory will embody certain
epistemic virtues (simplicity, clarity, an absence of
internal and external conceptual problems, predictive
success, empirical accuracy, scope of relevance,
fruitfulness in guiding new research, utilization of
appropriate ways of explaining things . . .).
SR5: The aim of science is a literally true conception
of the theory-independent external world.
Thus an outstanding trademark for the critical
realist approach is increased precision and warrant
for the views that they articulate.
In the wake of Renaissance Humanism, evangelical
theology tends to be proposed within commonsense
realism. However, there are some critical realist
theologians who have proposed a more nuanced
approach toward God, which admits to subjectivity
from one’s contexts and point of view. These critical
realist theologians appreciate renaissance humanism
at an even more precise level. For example, William
G. T. Shedd acknowledged progressiveness within the
discipline of theology that would be characterized as
a discipline wide critical realism in his comments on
“The ﬁrst investigator is not so likely to strike upon the
intrinsic constitution of a thing as the last one, because
he has not the light of previous inquiries. Methods of
investigation are continually undergoing correction
and modiﬁcation, and are thus brought closer to the
organization of the object” (Shedd, n.d., vol. 1, p. 4).
With the discipline of theology developing, theology
should not be thought of as a static authoritative
tradition or Kuhnian “paradigm.” Rather developing
theology should be thought of as Lakatos’ “Research
Programs” which undergo nuanced revolutionary
change as theology proposals develop. This approach is
more accurate description of theological development
than viewing such development through a Kuhnian
lens because with every new theological development,
advocates of the outmoded positions remain in their
earlier less-nuanced positions. For example, the
radical shift in paradigms about which Thomas Kuhn
wrote about in his Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions
(Kuhn, 1962) are like the change from the view of
the Ptolemaic universe (sun and everything revolves
around the earth) to a Copernican universe (in
the solar system the planets revolve around the
sun). Theologically, this would be like the radical
shift from Platonic to Aristotelian theology, under
Thomas Aquinas. Whereas, a Lakatos theorist
would recognize even as the weight of adherence
from Platonic to Aristotelian theology shifted there
remained advocates for both approaches, a condition
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which Kuhn would say was illegitimate, but in fact
describes the reality. That is, many philosophical,
theological, and traditional approaches advocated
in the past still have contemporary advocates.
Furthermore, many of these theological variants
retain aspects of the previous philosophical approach
within them as they moved on with a new philosophical
base, as is evident by the resilience of such features as
Platonic simplicity of God which continues to appear
throughout many later theological approaches. So
instead of monolithic change in the Kuhnian pattern
it is better to recognize a Lakatosian approach which
permits modest incremental changes within changing
paradigms. That is, a better model for change than the
Copernican model would be the contemporary rivalry
among relativistic, quantum, and string theories in
physics. A critical realist approach values recognizing
the precise differences of these varied approaches,
and crafting a nuanced method that reﬂects this
sensitivity.
Among earlier evangelical theologians, perhaps
only A. H. Strong opted for a more nuanced personal
critical realist position. Strong afﬁrms both: [1] that
“the laws of our thought are laws of God’s thought and
[2] that the results are normally conducted thinking
with regard to God correspond to the objective reality”
(Strong, 1907, vol. 1, p. 10, [] added for clarity). At the
same time he conceded that “all knowledge is relative
to the knowing agent; that is what we know, we know
not as it is objectively but only as it is related to our
senses and faculties” (Strong).
The philosopher-theologian Stuart Hackett
clearly positioned himself within a critical realist
epistemology, with his rational-empiricist Christianity
(Hackett, 1957, pp. 37–175; 1984, 11–83; also Moser,
1986, 1989). Hackett saw that moderate foundations
provided the starting points for any legitimate world
view. These foundations include: rational, empirical,
and incorrigible contributions.
(1) A few rational or self-evident foundations provide
the structure of our knowledge,
(2) empirical foundation of a person’s immediate
awareness of his own states of consciousness largely
provides the content of our knowledge.
(3) Finally, incorrigibility (that is, whatever a person
knows and cannot be convinced otherwise because it
would plunge him into paralyzing skepticism if he
were consistent with its denial), largely connects a
person coherently with the essentials of their world
view.
(1) The rational foundations which he grants
are: the laws of identity and contradiction, I think
therefore I am, performative statements, and the
deﬁnitional difference between related terms (like:
cause and effect; and possible, actual and necessary).
Hackett’s rational foundations join Lakatos’ rational
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foundation of derivation in mathematics (Lakatos,
1963–64, pp. 1–25).
(2) Hackett’s empirical foundations provide for
largely an analytical philosophic approach. From this
modest base, he argues for the existence and nature
of God and then builds up a theology and metaphysic
from there. As a result of these arguments,
(3) Hackett grants biblical authority and informs
his world view from the Bible as part of an incorrigible
foundation for his Christianity, philosophy, and
theology. From these modest foundations, Hackett
argues for the existence and nature of God and then
builds up a theology and metaphysic from there.
He sees God and the world through the lens of
epistemological dualism so that there are ways from
argument and experience to further warrant the
belief system that is being built by the theologian to
represent the reality that exists.
Alister McGrath presents theological method
as a critical realist. He often presents it as an
empirically based pragmatic realism or when he adds
mathematical derivation to it, he calls this method,
“critical realism” (McGrath, 2001, pp. 71–77; 2002,
pp. xv–xvi, 123–244, especially 188; also Lonergan,
1972, p. 234; 1988, pp. 205–221; also van Huyssteen,
1989, pp. 123–197). He sees that empirically based
pragmatism is the foundation for this realism
in the natural sciences, following Roy Bhasker’s
scientiﬁc realism (Bhasker, 1986, 1997, 1998; Collier,
1994; McGrath, 2002, pp. 257, 174–175). Bhasker’s
approach while individually Kantian, is corporately
Durkheimian with a collectivist conception of society
which establishes the reality of social facts in an open
system which grows (Bhasker, 1998, pp. 38–41, 41).
McGrath works within this method where nature is
interpreted as a socially mediated construct of science
and theology about beings (McGrath, 2001, vol. 1,
p. 4). However, I suspect that McGrath’s conﬁdence
in mathematical derivation provides a rational
underpinning (foundation?) for some aspects of his
model that Bhasker does not himself grant within his
non-foundational approach. Through the community
agreement, Bhasker calls his approach a necessary
ontological realism, which for McGrath would
preserve a necessary ontological theology (Bhasker,
1986, p. 24). McGrath justiﬁes this unitary approach
to science and theology on the basis of the Christian
doctrine of creation (McGrath, 2001, vol. 1, p. 21).
He illustrates this methodology several times over,
especially in physics. He rejects foundationalism for
its lack of elegance, but admits that Paul Moser has
nicely defended a moderate foundationalism (McGrath,
2002, vol. 2, p. 24, 26–39; Moser, 1986, 1989). He then
justiﬁes his critical realism as against conventionalist
approaches, which would be either anti-realist,
theory dependent, or indebted to James pragmatism.
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McGrath develops a critical realism that engages
the world at a variety of levels, each evaluated for its
clarity and predictability. He extends this scientiﬁc
method to theology as an attempt to behold reality
communally, with theology as a scientiﬁc discipline
in a critical realist methodology. Theology for him
becomes a communal task of the collective wisdom
that has won acceptance within the community
(McGrath, 2003, vol. 3, p. 28). “Doctrine may thus be
provisionally deﬁned as communally authoritative
teachings regarded as essential to the identity of the
Christian community, in which the community tells
itself and outsiders what it has seen, and what it has
become in response to this vision” (McGrath, 2003,
vol. 3, p. 28). However, McGrath admits that when
it comes to heresy, there is an individual aspect to
doctrine in order for the community to exclude the
heretic (McGrath, 2003, vol. 3, p. 223).
McGrath’s strengths take his critical realism in
two primary directions of increased precision: (a)
issues of science and religion, and (b) church history.
With a Ph.D. in molecular biophysics, he repeatedly
contributes with precision to the integration of science
and religion (McGrath, 1998a, 1999, 2001, 2002,
2003). However, with his second Ph.D. in church
history, he shows his precision in this area as well
(1998b).
Alan Padgett contributes signiﬁcantly toward
allowing theology and each science discipline to
mutually contribute what they have to give within a
critical realism.
Once we grant that there are different sorts of
schemes for explaining the same thing, and they do
not reduce to each other, this raises the question of
their interrelationship. Since the sort of explanation
we have in mind is causal, these schemes postulate
certain causal relationships that hold between things.
They develop models for the nature and powers of
things involved, their regular causal relations, laws
describing the regularities in these relations, and
general theories. What happens, it seems, is that
some levels are more fundamental than others in the
following sense: the accepted results of the scheme at
the more fundamental level is used, and assumed, in
the next level up. So particle physics is assumed in
thermodynamics, and psychology and sociology are
assumed in history (Padgett, 1996, 18–19; 2003).
Alan Padgett continues to develop that there is likely
a two way-dialog between these more fundamental
and higher order disciplines. Though he admits that
sometimes in social sciences the more fundamental
discipline may not be that clear, as may be the case
with psychology and sociology.
Nancey Murphy recognizes this sort of higher order
and foundational relationship and places theology
as the highest order science but able to engage with
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the other disciplines on down to the foundation
(Murphy, 2002). That is, each of these disciplines are
commensurable (able to be compared to each other)
though their focus and scope are different. Within
such a framework, theology has the broadest scope
as well as distinctive focus. For example, alcoholism
can be analyzed: (a) chemically on a level of chemical
reactions, (b) biologically, on a level of genetic
predisposition, (c) psychologically, as a defense
mechanism such as avoidance, (d) sociologically, as a
learned trait within families and social groups that
destroys them, (e) ethically as a destructive vice, and
(f) theologically as rebellious sin, from which one
should repent to depend on God (Ephesians 5:18).
Critical realism would recognize that each of these
analyses is accurate and some demand a volitional
change.
Furthermore, Nancey Murphy proposes a critical
realist theological method after the pattern of Lakatos
philosophy of science (Murphy, 1990, pp. 51–81). Imre
Lakatos articulated a rational model of derivation
in the philosophy of mathematics and science that
utilized Peircian pragmatism to encourage its
productivity and to make sense of paradigm change
(Lakatos, 1963–1964, pp. 1–25, 120–139, 221–243,
296–342; 1970, pp. 91–195). Nancey Murphy suggests
this method is the best process to explain how change
in a theological product can occur while maintaining
many of one’s other theological commitments. That is,
this approach can be seen as a more precise analysis
of paradigm change, showing that paradigms are
not as monolithic as Kuhn had proposed, nor is data
retrievable only from within a paradigm. One of the
critiques of Kuhn is that those in one paradigm can
not perceive or communicate with those in another
paradigm and that clearly does not describe the
way paradigm change occurs. As one paradigm is
unraveling the other is building strength of congruity
and comprehensiveness. Lakatos proposed that each
study a person accomplishes becomes a “research
program” that works along side others and can be
judged as rival programs, whether progressive or
degenerative (Lakatos, 1970, pp. 118–119). Lakatos
proposes a sophisticated falsiﬁcation view of religious
language that encourages development.
Contrary to naïve falsiﬁcation [like Kuhn],
no experiment, experimental report, observation
statement or well-corroborated low-level falsiﬁying
hypothesis alone can lead to falsiﬁcation. There is no
falsiﬁcation before the emergence of a better theory . . .
Thus the crucial element in falsiﬁcation is whether
the new theory offers any novel, excess information
compared with its predecessor and whether some
of this excess information is corroborated (Lakatos,
1970, pp. 119–120, 227).
Thus a creationist model needs to focus on crafting
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better theories rather than merely trying to falsify
evolution or they will never be seriously considered
by the academy as a live option. Attempts to falsify
evolution will be simply considered as annoyances like
mosquitoes from quacks like ﬂat earthers. Lakatos
countering quotes from Popper, compares Kuhn’s
approach to his own.
While naïve falsiﬁcation stresses “the urgency
of replacing a falsiﬁed hypothesis by a better one,”
sophisticated falsiﬁcationism stresses the urgency of
replacing any hypothesis by a better one. Falsiﬁcation
cannot “compel the theorist to search for a better
theory,” simply because falsiﬁcation cannot precede
the better theory (Lakatos, 1970, p. 122).
So the creationist needs to work for better theories
or the evolutionist (or alternative creationist) will not
see creationism falsifying their approaches. Likewise,
this approach encourages a progressive orientation of
a positive theology model to keep theology current
with the latest biblical and philosophically warranted
ﬁndings rather than static to a tradition. This would
encourage a theologian to follow the Bible wherever
it leads, provided it is exegeted in a contextually
sensitive manner. Likewise, the theologian should
follow moderately foundationally grounded logic
wherever it leads provided it does not counter clear
biblical statements. That is, Lakatos’ approach is not
so much a justiﬁcation for theory choice, as much as a
framework for making sense of how one should hold
a theory. The justiﬁcation for the theologian comes
from exegesis and grounded philosophizing.
Lakatos has been criticized by Steve Barnett as
not providing prescriptive criteria sufﬁcient to make
decisions on whether the programs are progressive
or degenerative. That is, Barnett charges that
the criterion is too subjective so that whether it is
progressive or degenerative is only recognizable
after the fact. Trial by error is the risk in pragmatic
tests that the observer does not know whether
veriﬁcation or falsiﬁcation will occur unless he
submits his proposal to experiment. However, further
conﬁrmation by experiments is not a shot in the dark
because warranted experiments lay down a trajectory
that indicates further conﬁrmation will likely obtain.
Even more, in theology this is not a defeater
argument against the Lakatos’ method because
it only provides a description for the quest for an
epistemically better research program and the
sociology for doing this task. That is, biological
science’s observational data may be available without
providing a prescriptive criteria or interpretive
thrust, but the intelligent design movement would
argue otherwise (Ratzsch, 2001). Likewise, theology
also has a different data strain that includes its
interpretive trust within it’s content. I think that the
prescriptive criterion to choose a superior theological
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option is provided in the form of data appropriated for
a theological project. That is, rational derivation from
foundations or transcendental arguments includes
criteria of coherence to the rationally foundational
and to a lesser degree coherency to the theological
project provided it does not contradict any other
strongly warranted feature of the world view. In my
Classical Christian God, I grounded and framed
out my theological program beginning with this
approach (Kennard, 2002, pp. 11–86). However, most
of the data appropriated for a theological project will
be textual from the Bible. Such textual data has an
interpretive thrust within it identifying how the
interpreter should understand the data and whether
it corresponds appropriately in a biblical theology to
which the Bible contributes. Thus the Bible provides
its criteria (of coherence and correspondence with
the biblical text) for warranting theology. That is, we
should use biblical texts to make the points that they
are making in their context, rather than imposing
upon them our theological agenda. Thus provided
theology is congruent with the thrust of the biblical
texts that speak to this issue, a theology warrants
itself. In ﬁlling out my theology in the Classical
Christian God, the thrust of the biblical text
dominates the theological content, agenda, and thus
provides the criteria for appropriateness within itself
(Kennard, 2002, pp. 87–204). Thus in the analysis of
a critical realist theological method, I must supply
an analysis of the process of (a) hermeneutics, (b)
biblical theology, and (c) how biblical theology truths
contribute to systematic theology. My upcoming book,
A Critical Realist’s Theological Method explains this
process.
A number of the authors of GRUE! The New
Riddle of Induction (Stalker, 1994) appeal for a
skepticism to the method of science that is caused
by the unboundedness of the investigation data (as
well as the issue Barnett raised above) and thus the
inability to complete a generalization with conﬁdence
that removes alternative subjective interpretations.
This may at times be a legitimate critique in the
empirical scientiﬁc condition when rival theories can
not exclude the other theory as degenerate. However,
theological science can sidestep this criticism for at
least two reasons. First, the previous paragraph point,
that the interpretation thrust is imbedded within
the biblical text itself as the thrust of the speechact, which diminishes rival options as degenerative.
Secondly, the biblical data on any doctrinal point is
a self-contained body of texts within the canonical
bounds of the Bible, so that generalizations can be
made with regard to the whole. There is no fear of
a larger sample overwhelming the sample studied
to date, provided the generalization was made
concerning the comprehensive set of biblical texts
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(properly understood in their contexts) that address
this doctrinal point. Of course, with more information
becoming available (like the ﬁnd of the Dead Sea
Scrolls) more can be understood about the context of
biblical texts. However, archeologically open contexts
while inﬂuential to inform interpretation possibilities,
does not render an interpretation deﬁnitive because
primarily the context for the biblical text is provided
within the information in the biblical text itself.
However, all science is not adrift in a lack of
progressive clarity and unboundedness. Those sciences
that are mathematically derived and available for
nuanced falsiﬁcation that have marshaled substantial
repeated demonstration of their conclusions have also
stepped beyond these criticisms. First, mathematical
derivation, such as Newton provides for his three laws
of motion orient the discipline to an already warranted
option on its rational basis. Lakatos afﬁrms a role
for this mathematical derivation as a foundation
(Lakatos, 1963–1964, pp. 1–25). Then a statistical
analysis of repeated testing of these laws shows that
they govern reality, provided conditions close to the
ideal are met. If additional variables are added (like
a thick medium or a resistant wind) then they can be
factored in to take them into account as well. So these
criticisms do not seem to tell against all forms of science
either. This approach of mathematical derivation and
empirical testing (Peircian pragmatism) is still being
utilized as is apparent by the contribution of Steven
Weinberg’s derivation and mathematical theory
that uniﬁes the weak and electromagnetic forces in
an attempt for the uniﬁed ﬁeld theory for the four
forces (gravity, electromagnetism, strong and weak
forces). This Peircian pragmatic testing is where
Lakatos progressive research proposal is attempting
to contribute.
Working within this critical realist approach,
each theologian or scientist has several research
programs. Some of their research programs serve
as a personal hard core, which is central to their
program. Auxiliary hypotheses that add information
that allow the data to be related to the theory are
conjoined to the core. Auxiliary hypotheses form a
“protective belt” around the hard core because they
are modiﬁed when falsifying data emerge. Lakatos
admits that any theory can be saved from falsiﬁcation
by altering it somewhere (that is, a ceteris paribus
clause) and these modiﬁcations would occur to this
belt of auxiliary hypotheses. However, Lakatos
incorporates a simplicity element from Duhem (1954);
progressive afﬁliated hypothesis must intimately
extend the previous hypothesis rather than merely
by conjunction (Lakatos, 1970, p. 131). He calls this
the “tacking paradox” and values a uniﬁed solution
to problems rather than one that requires multiple
contrary tacks like in a sail boat trying to sail close
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into the wind. In my opinion the remainder of the
uniﬁed ﬁeld theory proposed in the esoteric string
theory with at least ten dimensions has mired down
in huge tact that have no explainable basis in reality,
nor are they able to be tested empirically, so in my
opinion this model stands as a real degenerative
model, even though the mathematical equations
unify it theoretically. At this point I don’t believe
that the beauty of a model can save it from the lack
of some degree of sophisticated falsiﬁcation. In this
methodical approach it is better to limit tacks to
that which are testable within the reality that the
discipline is attempting to describe. Within this
method, any individual may be researching several
auxiliary hypotheses within a largely resilient world
view, surrounding the individual’s hard core theology
and science.
Murphy describes such a research program as “a
series of complex theories whose core remains the
same while auxiliary hypotheses are successively
modiﬁed, replaced, or ampliﬁed in order to account
for problematic observations” (Murphy, 1990, p. 59).
A program is progressive if the internal features
are predictive of novel facts, and correspond to
the full range of data from the biblical text in a
congruent manner. Contrasting to this, a program is
degenerative if it does not take recognized data into
account and responds with ad hoc face saving devices.
Such degenerative techniques become self-stultifying.
The relative power of the research program has to do
with its ability to increase scientiﬁc or theological
knowledge.
In science a similar approach can be used within
the framework provided by the theological method.
Therefore, biblically grounded theology, with rational
and mathematical derivation provides the grid of
coherency with which scientiﬁc options should be
considered. Then scientiﬁc Lakatos research programs
can be conﬁgured within this framework. Progressive
programs are those which are empirically coherent
and congruent to all the data available to make a
responsible proposal. This is similar to the rational
criteria that William Bartley provides to eliminate
error, with the additional role of Bible and theology
added. Bartley’s criteria for rational control are
(Bartley, 1964, p. 158; also echoed by van Huyssteen,
1989, p. 42):
(1) The control of logic: the question whether a
given theory is logically consistent.
(2) The control of sensory perception: the question
whether a theory is empirically falsiﬁable through
sensory perception.
(3) The control of the theory of science: the question
whether a given theory is in line or in conﬂict with
other scientiﬁc hypotheses and with the formulation
of problems in philosophy of science as such.
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(4) The control of the problem: the question of which
problem a given theory is supposed to solve, and of
whether a given theory is successful in its solution of
that problem.
Furthermore, increased conﬁdence in a progressive
model is obtained by the most comprehensive
pragmatic proposal (without arbitrarily complexity)
that best predicts and repeatedly demonstrates itself
in testing further data. Ernan McMullin, in his
presidential address to the American Philosophical
Association argued for fruitfulness of epistemic
understanding as indicating a better theory, similar
to this Lakatos’ view.
The rationality of science can be philosophically
justiﬁed. Here I disagree with Kuhn. What
philosophers of science have labored so long to show is
that such values of fertility are appropriate criterion of
theory. Their arguments are in a broad sense logical
or epistemological (McMullin, 1984, p. 57).
Using this approach, repeatable science, as in the
making of chemical compounds, shows its progressive
hypotheses to be strongly warranted in Peircian
pragmatism. Whereas, in non-repeatable science (like
biology and geology) the fruitfulness of prediction
contained in a progressive hypothesis warrants
itself until sufﬁcient data challenges this reigning
proposal to be considered degenerative. To the extent
that equally warranted rival proposals explain the
data, the scientist should be tentative about these
hypotheses within his discipline.
Such a Lakatos’ approach governs community
theology as well. A group’s tradition is made up of
the commonness of those individuals in this group.
This means that what the group agrees upon and
considers essential becomes the group’s hard core. Any
tradition grants that certain afﬁrmations possess an
undeniable claim as a hard core of one’s world view. So
for any group that has deﬁned a hard core doctrinal
statement, a denial of such a feature of the hard core
could be considered to be heresy, whereas progressive
development of this hard core need not be considered
to be heresy. Actually, Lakatos would urge us not to
identify heresy as denial of communal hard core, for
“it still has the right to exist,” allowing the weeds to
grow among the fruitful theology (Lakatos, 1999,
p. 379; Matthew. 13:29, 38–43). However, in theology
to challenge a feature of a group’s hard core runs the
risk of being considered heretical. Such a challenge
is not likely to succeed unless the proposed feature,
denying an aspect of the hard core, is: (a) grounded
elsewhere in the group’s hard core or (b) that a clear
argument can be marshaled that the group’s hard
core feature is itself contradictory, that the proposal
is intended to replace.
In physics, such progressive Lakatos research
programs would be the rival theories like that of
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relativity and quantum, which both excel their
Newtonian classical physics predecessor in certain
aspects of precision and predictability. Lakatos urges
against letting such research programs become
normal science as a world view.
One must never allow a research program to
become a Weltanschauung, or a sort of scientiﬁc rigour,
setting itself up as an arbiter between explanation
and non-explanation, as mathematical rigour sets
itself up as an arbiter between proof and non-proof.
Unfortunately this is the position which Kuhn tends
to advocate: indeed, what he calls “normal science” is
nothing but a research programme that has achieved
monopoly. But, as a matter of fact, research programs
have achieved complete monopoly only rarely and then
only for relatively short periods, in spite of the efforts
of some Cartesians, Newtonians, and Bohrians.
The history of science has been and should be a
history of competing research programmes (or, if
you wish “paradigms”), but it has not been and must
not become a succession of periods of normal science:
the sooner competition starts, the better for progress

(Lakatos, 1990, p. 155).
This results in the essential ingredient for a living
science to be in continuous development. This issue of
“normal” theology and progressiveness of the discipline
will be explored at greater depth within my book, A
Critical Realist’s Theological Method. There I argue
that rival traditions (Grand Tradition, Orthodox,
Roman Catholic, Reformation Founders and Biblical
Theology, Critical theology, majority Evangelicalism
with Pietism, and Post-Modern) all claimed this
normal status and yet all of them have living advocates.
Such a normalcy approach diminishes dialog between
these traditions, isolating their advocates to their
own traditions. It would be better if these traditions
listened to each other, since they often claim to value
similar aspects (like biblical authority) and what any
tradition considers appropriate progressiveness could
help other traditions think through the implications
of its values. I think that Lakatos more precisely
explains and better encourages how this process is
done in theology, than the tendency to normalize one’s
own tradition.
Unfortunately many in theology view the research
programs as more Kuhnian monolithic traditions,
either as a grand Christian tradition or as resolving
toward the favor of our community’s tradition, and
against all other rival traditions. Such a “normal
tradition” view does not help theology as a discipline
to progress or keep current with exegetical ﬁndings
(Lakatos, 1990, 173–175). However, in my book A
Critical Realist’s Theological Method, I also show
that such a Kuhnian normal tradition view is not
accurate to the facts of the history of theology either.
For example, with each new traditional framework
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the older tradition remained with adherents, resulting
in several rival traditions continuing as Lakatos had
developed that they would. Additionally, the rival
traditions sometimes incorporate features at odds with
their stated assumptions. A Lakatos method better
makes sense of this inconsistency as a degenerative
feature rather than as heresy.
In a “normal” theology or Kuhnian approach,
any deviation from the tradition becomes heresy. In
a Lakatos approach, degenerative and progressive
features of the afﬁliated hypothesis which an
individual or group maintains around their hard core
would not be heresy. Though, obviously degenerative
features would be advantageous to grow beyond even
though they are not heretical. Likewise, progressive
proposals would be advantageous for a tradition to
embrace if it is interested in keeping current with its
disciplines or thinking through its implications.
I think that in the science of origins a similar
condition occurs between the evangelical populous
Creationism and critical Romantic Evolutionism.
The Kuhnian approach tends to bifurcate into two
camps, ruling out the possibility of a nuanced more
accurate way between them. A Lakatosian approach
would encourage a more nuanced research program
wherever the data stream would lead to truth. One
example, is Todd Wood’s studies of baraminology,
which I brieﬂy identify here in a Lakatosian critical
realistic methodology (Wood, 2005). Todd Wood is
a realist in that he starts with taxum of observed
characteristics but tries to prevent personal bias
by approaching each animal through a multiplicity
of frameworks set forward by other researchers
and evaluates them all for their similarities and
differences (baraminic distance). He seems to be
utilizing a strategy pioneered by Robert Sokal and
Peter Sneath (Sokal & Sneath, 1963) but appropriated
and nuanced further by Wood to ﬂoat a robust method
with a progressive research program that reproduces
predictable results.
Those who have charted the landscape before Dr.
Wood framed this ﬁeld of baraminology within a
critical realist mindset, if not always within a Lakatos
approach. However, a brief summary of the development
before Wood also indicates that the discipline should
be understood to have grown as Lakatos described
progressive development to occur. For example, in the
1940s Frank Marsh deﬁned the term baramin (off
the Hebrew: bara/creation + min/kind) and ﬂoated a
nuanced theory which permits changes within a kind
but not beyond a kind (Brand, 1997; Marsh, 1944,
p. 24; Wood, 2003a, pp. 1–12, 2003b). In 1990, Walter
ReMine proposed a discontinuity strategy to exclude
baramins from each other. Out of his work came more
speciﬁc terminology: (a) holobaramin or “a complete
set of organisms related by common descent,” (b)
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monobaramin or “a group containing only organisms
related by common descent,” (c) apobaramin or “a
group which contains all ancestors and descendents of
any of its members, but contain subgroups that are not
related to each other,” and (d) polybaramin or “a group
of organisms not sharing an ancestor or descendent
with any organism outside the group” (ReMine, 1990,
pp. 207–213, 1993). In 1993, Siegried Scherer
also proposed a “basic type” of life for the German
creationist group Word and Knowledge that advanced
the classiﬁcation category into scientiﬁc veriﬁcation
(Scherer, 1993, pp. 11–30). Also in 1990, Kurt
Wise fused ReMine’s terminology and successive
approximations with: (a) Scripture as a source,
(b) discontinuity systematics and (c) Basic Type
biology, which fusion meant an advance in scientiﬁc
veriﬁcation without reference to verifying ancestry
(Wise, 1990, pp. 345–358, 1992, pp. 122–137, 2002).
As such, Wise and Wood utilize the following nuanced
terminology to distinguish baramins from each other:
(a) monobaramin as “a group of organisms which is not
completely divided by a phyletic discontinuity, but may
or may not be separated from all other organisms by
phyletic discontinuities,” (b) polybaramin as “a group
of organisms divided by at least one discontinuity,”
and (c) apobaramin as “separated from all other
organisms by phyletic discontinuity, but may not be
divided by at least one phyletic discontinuity.”
Personally for me in theology, each section of one
of my theological papers, chapters or books also
becomes a new research program in a Lakatosian
sense. Usually, these programs are not rivals in
my theology but serve to compliment other studies
that deal with similar issues. These complimentary
relations are evident in Murphy’s phrase, “Philosophy
of religion without theology is empty; theology without
philosophy of religion is blind” (Murphy, 1990, p. xii).
As with Murphy, my philosophy and theology are
interpenetrated (Kennard, 2002). However, to this I
would add a second phrase, theology is impotent with
regard to authority unless it is reﬂective of biblical
theology, and biblical theology is impotent with regard
to authority unless it is reﬂective of the biblical text
in its context. I choose a critical realist methodology
for my theology for its precise sight and a biblically
theologically driven theology for its retention and
clarity of the biblical message and authority.
Murphy admits “it is conceivable that a theological
research program could be built up from the bottom
(that is, ‘induction’ from data)” [as I am trying to
do] but she concludes from her experience “that
theologians need an organizing idea before they start”
(Murphy, 1990, p. 184). Perhaps my organizing idea
is to let contextual biblical exegesis and grounded
philosophizing speak clearly what they have to give.
That is, honestly letting the available data speak
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with its own voice from its context. She suggests that
she would start with “a minimal doctrine of God.
including, say, the Trinitarian nature of God, God’s
holiness, and God’s revelation in Jesus” (Murphy,
1990). Furthermore, if she were to produce a
systematic theology, she admits that she would ﬁnd a
place for at least two important auxiliary hypotheses:
(a) something like Edwards theory regarding the
validity of signs of the Holy Spirit, and (b) a doctrine
of revelation based on Paul’s account of the gifts of the
Holy Spirit (Murphy, 1990, p. 187). These are features
I would include as well.
My theological method can be modestly grounded
in the philosophical manner of Stuart Hackett but
most of the content of my theological method actually
is framed by biblical theology using a Lakatos method
to inductively describe the biblical texts through
a hermeneutical spiral. Consistent with Lakatos’
mathematical derivation a foundational rational
tightness is permitted (as Hackett provides or as I
use, as is evident in chapters 2 and 3 of The Classical
Christian God, where I deduce and induce the existence
and some attributes of God philosophically; Kennard,
2002, pp. 11–62). David Clark advocates a similar
moderately foundational Lakatosian theological
method (Clark, 2003, pp. 82, 161–163, 304).
I recognize that often I do not need to investigate my
foundations. I grant Hackett’s and Moser’s moderate
foundations but I don’t think that they get you very far
theologically. So in many ways my theology primarily
rests upon my incorrigible awareness of my basic
beliefs. These high priority incorrigible basic beliefs
include:
(1) A theistic God exists that we can know which
we identify with the trinitarian God of the Bible.
(2) The Bible itself is God’s authoritative revelation
and can be understood clearly through normal human
means of interpretation.
(3) The tools of knowing a reality beyond myself
are accessible to us without substantial deception
even though they involve subjectivity.
(4) Though I allow my perspective to have priority
for me, I value others’ perspectives in community as
corroborating or challenging my own.
(5) The Bible portrays a salvation message which
I and a historical community of “Christians” may
appropriate.
(6) This core salvation message for Christians at
least includes God graciously providing everlasting
life and inheritance in Kingdom on the basis of what
God and Christ are and accomplish, which without
Their effort would leave humans damned at an
eschatological judgment.
(7) I have the relationships (wife, family, colleagues,
students, and otherwise) that I have.
Some of these beliefs are layered (6 depends upon
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5 which depends upon 2, and 7 depends upon 3)
but these are helpful to clarify my particular basic
orientation for my web of belief. Upon these basic
beliefs (and moderate foundations beneath some of
them) my subsequent biblical theology studies are
framed as Lakatos research programs that ﬁll out
my theological musings. Each of these chapters of
this book and the other books which I have written
serve as these auxiliary hypotheses in the whole of
my theology.
Furthermore, when I am framing a hypothesis,
I ﬁnd that a communal appraisal of my colleagues
is helpful to help me to be clear and to balance my
subjectivity by their own. But most of these hypotheses
begin with individual exegetical studies, which I
acknowledge I also approach as a critical realist. In
these studies, I try to be as clear as the text is clear
and to be as ambiguous as the text is ambiguous.
This critical realist approach has been appropriated
into contemporary hermeneutics by moderate
evangelicals working with the historical Jesus. These
wish to express critical realism’s hermeneutical spiral
with precision and ﬁnd value in allowing epistemic
categories to inform hermeneutical ones (Kennard,
1999, pp. 57–58, 124–125, 133–134). That is, the
textual data is observed by interpreter, such that they
ﬂoat a proposal for the meaning of a text that is then
checked by comparing it to the details present in the
text itself. Then the process is repeated drawing closer
and closer to what the text actually says in itself. This
hermeneutical process will be described more fully in
the chapter “A Thiselton-Ricoeur Hermeneutic” later
in this book.
Summary
I have obvious allegiances among these philosophical
frameworks for the reasons presented here. Namely,
I am most committed to biblical theology, which is
the biblical side of the renaissance humanistic root.
Beyond this, I also approach things with precision as
a critical realist. This means that my philosophy is a
conglomeration of a range of philosophers developed
and afﬁrmed above.
The features of this critical realist philosophical
method can be brieﬂy summarized by a metaphor of
a tree that identiﬁes these techniques with greater
certainty or plausibility should be given privilege of
preferential place in framing a worldview, theology,
and science. Returning to this tree metaphor
identiﬁed in the introduction chapter will help clarify
where contributions ﬁt, contributing to my worldview
and method for theology and science. I ground the
place of my worldview with moderate foundational
roots from: (a) rationalism (like: law of identity,
law of noncontradiction, “I think therefore I am,”
and performative language), (b) empiricism (like
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immediate sensations), and (c) incorrigible (basic
beliefs). I allow certain knowledge of mathematical
derivation and rationalism (for example, ontological
argument) to frame the trunk of my epistemic tree.
The important weight bearing branches are then
framed by empiricism which further conﬁrms itself
by rational argument (for example, cosmological
argument, teleological argument) and by Peircian
pragmatism (for example, exegesis by hermeneutical
spiral, testable science, and historical study from
evidence). Preferred among this empirically based
Peircian pragmatism is a hermeneutical spiral of
well attested peer reviewed exegesis of Scripture
because it possesses divine authority and the text’s
interpretive thrust is within the text itself giving it
a distinct edge over empirical observation of other
media (compare forthcoming book, Kennard, A
Critical Realist’s Theological Method). This priority
would insist on theology and science to be nested
within this biblicism. So a divinely inspired creation
account should be given preferential place in framing
issues of origins and a peer reviewed warranted
exposition expressing those biblical sentiments
should as well. Close behind this in credibility is peer
reviewed Peircian pragmatically tested empirical
science. Of course tentative exegesis and promising
but not veriﬁed Peircian pragmatic science should be
held more tentatively. Thus warranted science can
affect the exegesis of texts, such as in a Copernican
solar system the biblical phrases of the “sun rises
and sets” should be understood phenomenologically
as that of appearance while the earth spins on its
axis and revolves around the sun. Such tentativeness
within theology and science, should move this
research program within its discipline to a more
peripheral place of the medium branches of the tree,
and should be governed by a Lakatos’ method with
its sophisticated falsiﬁcation. Smaller more tentative
branches can be governed by James’ pragmatism,
which should ﬁt within and not contradict the
already placed warranted peer reviewed exegesis,
theology and science. Even Dewyian pragmatism
could be given some place among non-moral twigs of
the tree that do not contradict those branches framed
by epistemology, exegesis, theology and science.
Peripheral place of small twigs and leaves should be
given to: phenomenological, aesthetic, intuitional,
and existential strategies. None of these peripheral
options should displace, nor be permitted to overrule
the warranted peer reviewed exegesis, theology and
science. However, some of the contributions in this
peripheral area can be quite signiﬁcant. For example,
my phenomenological commitment to be involved with
Boy Scouts with my sons has certainly colored my life
in a major way. These peripheral areas of the tree’s
canopy also provide a sense of the whole big picture
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and vitality, which are very important for life. I rarely
ﬁnd existentialism bounded by the concerns of a
biblical world view except in perhaps something like:
Soren Kierkegaard’s reﬂections from the Synoptics or
Abraham, or Paul Ricoeur’s metaphors reﬂecting the
biblical text. If such a realist externalistic epistemology
provided limits for existentialism, I would certainly
wish to retain existentialism’s passion for authentic
living. Thus I advocate a passionate quest for truth
within these epistemic and methodological means.
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